New Zealand Faces Key Decisions on Gene Technology Bill

The New Zealand government is currently deliberating a significant overhaul of its gene technology legislation, nearly three decades after the implementation of the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act in 1996, which took a stringent precautionary stance. The proposed changes would enable the release of genetically engineered organisms into the environment, a move that has raised concerns among various political entities, including New Zealand First, the Labour Party, and the Green Party.

This discussion is not new for New Zealand, which has previously encountered issues related to the unintended release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). A notable example is the Corngate scandal of 2002, where then-Prime Minister Helen Clark faced public scrutiny after an interview with journalist John Campbell revealed details about the inadvertent release of genetically modified corn seeds in 2000. The government was criticized for allegedly obscuring information during a Royal Commission on Genetic Modification.

Although the Corngate incident remains infamous, it was never conclusively determined that genetically modified material contaminated the soil at that time. Testing of approximately 49,000 seeds yielded mixed results, with most samples returning negative for contamination. Those that indicated potential positive results were possibly affected by a common soil bacterium. Ultimately, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, now known as MPI, concluded that it was improbable that any genetically modified material had entered the soil.

Another incident, less publicized but equally significant, was the Operation Pacific breach in 2002. In this case, maize seeds cultivated in Pukekohe and Gisborne tested positive for genetically modified material. The seeds, imported from the United States for hybrid production, were identified during routine testing and were destroyed at an estimated cost of $500,000. An independent investigation revealed a high likelihood of contamination, emphasizing the potential for similar occurrences in the future.

The aftermath of Corngate prompted New Zealand to implement border testing for genetically modified material, with protocols designed to meet legal standards. Yet, it was acknowledged that these measures could not guarantee complete safety. Current discussions highlight the challenges in tracing gene-edited organisms, particularly those without foreign genes but with modified sequences. Detecting such modifications can be difficult, depending on several factors, including whether modifications are voluntarily identified and the types of tests employed.

As the new legislation is considered, questions arise regarding the development of reliable testing protocols capable of managing cross-contamination issues effectively. What systems can be established to ensure seed sources are free from contamination, such as documentation proving suppliers have not processed any gene-edited materials?

The Operation Pacific incident revealed regulatory gaps, as mandatory testing was required for corn but not for maize. The cost and time associated with recalling and destroying GM material were significant. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry had to piece together a detailed history of seed movements and handling, as well as review separation mechanisms at farms. The seed company involved incurred substantial losses but responded promptly to the incident, which helped facilitate the resolution.

With the gene technology industry being inherently speculative and requiring considerable investment, how will the new legislation balance the economic risks faced by both private and public investors against the potential environmental hazards? If private firms are liable for breaches, what encouragement remains for them to operate within New Zealand? Conversely, if accountability lies with taxpayers, what implications does that hold for public trust and funding?

Official reports on past breaches point to confusion regarding agency responsibilities. The Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act addressed only intentional releases, lacking alignment with the Biosecurity Act. Reports also identified gaps in technical expertise within both government and private sectors.

It remains unclear whether the proposed Gene Technology Bill adequately defines the responsibilities of agencies involved in managing accidental releases or cross-contamination incidents. Would an unintentional release fall under the purview of the Gene Technology Bill, or would it be classified as a biosecurity issue? The roles of the Ministry for Primary Industries and the Environmental Protection Agency in such scenarios remain ambiguous.

As the government contemplates the future of gene technology legislation, the challenges highlighted by past incidents demonstrate the difficulty of ensuring safety even with robust border procedures and testing. The ability to accurately detect contamination hinges on having precise criteria that can withstand legal scrutiny, all while acknowledging the potential for both false positives and negatives.

The conversation surrounding the Gene Technology Bill should focus on more than just tightening regulations. With increasing pressures from climate change, global competition, and political dynamics, it is vital to consider how to accept and mitigate risks of failure while fostering innovation within the industry. The pressing question is not merely how to secure containment but whether society can effectively navigate the complexities of gene technology in the face of inherent uncertainties.